Inception and Historic Course
The catalyst for the genesis of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is considered to be the British-French summit that took place in St. Malo in December 1998.

NATO gave the “green light” for the development of ESDP during the North Atlantic Council's fiftieth anniversary summit in Washington in April 1999, where the guidelines for EU-NATO cooperation in military crisis management, from the Alliance's standpoint, were drawn up.

ESDP was formally launched by the German Presidency during the first semester of 1999. The conclusions of the Cologne European Council (June 1999) constitute its official birth certificate.

Since then, ESDP, which is currently undergoing its gestation, has gone through different stages: Helsinki (December 1999), Feira (June 2000), Nice (December 2000), Goteborg (June 2001), Laeken (December 2001) and Seville (June 2002).

Definition and Contents
ESDP's ultimate aim is the framing of a common defence policy, as provided for in the Treaty on European Union (Article 17.1). However, in its current state it deals with military as well as non-military crisis management, within the framework of the so-called “Petersberg tasks” (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking). The main objective of ESDP is to support the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), being the CFSP's arm in the security field.

The EU has an autonomous capacity to take decisions and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises only when NATO as a whole is not engaged. In this way, the Alliance's predominant role is acknowledged, especially since it remains the basis for European collective defence.

But, above all, the EU recognizes the primacy of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security.

EU-led military crisis management operations, within the context of ESDP, can be conducted either with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities or autonomously, which means without the use of NATO assets and capabilities.

Structure and Operation of the ESDP Mechanism

1. Structures
   The political-military structures have already been established through the setting up and activation of the main bodies (Political and Security Committee / PSC, Military Committee / EUMC, Military Staff / EUMS), their subsidiary groups and committees (Political-Military Group / PMG, Military Committee Working Group / EUMCWG, Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crises Management / CIVCOM, Headline Goal Task Force / HTF) as well as other political-military units integrated into the Council's Secretariat (Policy Planning Unit, Situation Center - SITCEN). Moreover, the inclusion in the EU of the appropriate functions of the WEU (Satellite Center, Institute for Strategic Studies) has been completed.
2. Modus operandi
   As far as the functioning of the ESDP mechanism is concerned, the procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management have already been established, although they are under constant revision and up-dated in light of developments; these procedures describe the EU's approach to a crisis from the early warning phase to the stability promotion and post-conflict reconstruction stage. The Exercise policy and the Exercise Programme as well as the general framework for the financing of military operations have also been concluded.
3. Operational capability
   The ability of the EU to conduct some crisis management operations was declared at the European Council in Laeken. The meaning of this operational capacity, as it was defined in Laeken, is limited. The EU's capacity to carry out the whole range of the so-called “Petersberg tasks”, including the most demanding ones, will be built up progressively by 2003, as the assets and capabilities of both the military and civilian aspects of ESDP continue to develop.

   In that context, the EU plans to take over a police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina on January 1, 2003, succeeding the UN International Police Task Force, and is available to take responsibility, following elections in FYROM and at the request of its government, of an operation to follow that which is currently being undertaken by NATO in FYROM (known as Task Force Fox or Amber Fox), on the understanding that the permanent arrangements on EU-NATO cooperation will be in place by then.

Military Crisis Management

1. Headline Goal
   The capacities of the ESDP in the field of military crisis management are defined by the so-called Headline Goal that was agreed by the Helsinki European Council, according to which the member states, cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, must be able by 2003 to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons (up to 15 brigades) capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks. It should be emphasized, however, that this does not involve the establishment of a standing force, and, therefore, the term “European army”, which is usually used to describe it, is not accurate. This force should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and supported, as appropriate, by air and naval elements. Member states should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days and, within this timeframe, provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. Moreover, an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) will be required, at lower readiness, in order to provide replacements for the initial forces.

   On November 20, 2000, in Brussels, the member states took part in a Capabilities Commitment Conference, making it possible to draw together the specific national commitments corresponding to the Headline Goal requirements set by the Helsinki European Council. These contributions constitute a pool of more than 100,000 persons and approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels. The complementary contributions by third countries amount to about 10,000 persons.

   Greece's contribution consists of 4,700 men (one Operational Headquarter - 500 men, one Infantry brigade - 3,550 men, one MLRS Battalion - 500 men, one Attack Helicopters Company and four to six Transport Helicopters), 46 war planes and 13 war-ships.

   In November 2001 the Capability Improvement Conference took place, providing the opportunity to improve national contributions and to identify shortfalls and agree on a plan of action to remedy them. Even though the Headline Goal has already been accomplished in terms of quantity, significant shortfalls still exist, especially in the field of assets and collective capabilities. In order to rectify the remaining shortfalls, the European Council in Laeken adopted the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP). This Action Plan defines a method making it possible to mobilize voluntarily all efforts, investments, developments and coordination measures, both nationally and multi-nationally, in order to improve existing resources and progressively develop the capabilities needed for the Union's crisis management actions.

2. Involvement of third countries
   The ESDP project is open, which means that the involvement of third countries, under certain conditions, is welcomed. Involvement means offering additional contributions (in forces, assets and capabilities) in concrete operations in which third countries participate, but it also means having consultations with the EU on a regular basis outside crisis periods as well as enhanced consultations during crises. It also means participating, on an equal footing, in the day-to-day management of the operation.

   At the European Council in Nice, appropriate arrangements for dialogue, consultation and cooperation on issues related to security and defence policy and crisis management between the EU and third countries were established.

   The principal group of third countries that is involved in the ESDP is the so-called “15” group, i.e., the countries which are candidates for accession to the EU and the European allies which are not members of the EU, namely Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus, Malta, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey + Norway, Iceland. This group of states constitutes the so-called “single inclusive structure”, in which all 15 countries concerned are included in the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with the EU without any discrimination. All the states that have confirmed their participation in an EU-led operation by deploying significant military forces have the same rights and obligations as the EU participating member states in the day-to-day management of such an operation.

   A special sub-group is the one which consists of the “6” European NATO allies which are not members of the EU (Norway, Iceland, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Turkey). This sub-group receives privileged treatment when an EU-led crisis response operation requires the use of NATO assets and capabilities. In such a case the “6” allies can participate in the EU-led military crisis management operation if they so wish and they are involved in the operational planning.

   Moreover, in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets, the “6” are invited to take part, together with the other interested third countries, following a unanimous decision by the Council. In this case they enjoy the same rights and obligations as the candidate countries within the “single inclusive structure”.

   A different group of countries is the so-called “potential partners”, which consists of all other third countries and especially Russia, Ukraine and Canada.

3. NATO-EU cooperation
   At the very heart of NATO-EU cooperation in the field of military crisis management lies the so-called Berlin Plus agenda, which, as is stated in the Washington communique (NATO Summit, April 1999), consists of four topics that need to be settled so that the EU can have access to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance:
   • assured access to NATO's planning capabilities
   • pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets being at the disposal of the EU
   • identification of a range of European command options, including the role of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR)
   • further adaptation of NATO's defense planning system so as to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.

   EU-NATO relations, however, are not limited to the Berlin plus agenda, but include many other important issues, such as the Security Agreement, the permanent arrangements for consultations in crisis and outside crisis periods, as well as cooperation in the fields of capabilities development and exercises. All these issues, which are interrelated and should be dealt with in a comprehensive manner, constitute the so-called “permanent arrangements” between NATO and the EU.

   NATO-EU cooperation is based on a number of fundamental principles such as respect for the decision-making autonomy, equality, different nature and role of both organizations, as well as non-discrimination.

   The principle “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” has been adopted by NATO; it purports that an agreement has to be reached on each and every aspect of EU-NATO relations before a comprehensive and permanent settlement is concluded. If even one aspect of the relationship is pending, no definite agreement is possible.

4. The so-called “participation issue”
   Turkey, a non-EU European Ally, was not satisfied with the arrangements adopted by the Nice European Council for consultation with and participation of non-EU European NATO members. Therefore, Turkey is withholding its consent, using its veto right within NATO to conclude EU-NATO permanent arrangements, unless an upgraded consultative and participation status, even in autonomous EU-led operations, is given to the group of the “6” allies altogether. According to Turkey, the justification for these demands is attributable to Turkey's geo-strategic position.

   This has created the so-called “participation issue” of the “6” non-EU European NATO members in ESDP, which has, consequently, become an important parameter for the further development of EU-NATO relations.

   In an attempt to achieve a breakthrough, through bilateral initiatives, an agreement between Britain and Turkey was outlined in the so-called “Ankara document”.

   The said document was rejected by Greece for both procedural (due to the extra-institutional procedure which was followed) and substantive reasons (ESDP fundamental principles, such as EU-NATO equality, decision-making autonomy and non-discrimination were breached, and the “Ankara document” goes beyond Nice and compromises the national interests of Greece).

   In Barcelona (European Council, March 15-16) it was agreed that the Presidency, together with the Secretary General / High Representative and Greece would hold contacts in an effort to promote the settlement of this issue.

   These efforts resulted in a comprehensive proposal (package-deal) which was drafted by the Spanish Presidency, in cooperation with the Council's General Secretariat and with the assistance of some partners who have a more active involvement in this subject. Turkey, however, rejected the Spanish Presidency's proposal.

   At the Seville European Council, the progress achieved during the Spanish Presidency was acknowledged and the following Presidency (i.e., Greece, due to Denmark's opt-out) was assigned the task of continuing the efforts, along with the General Secretary / High Representative.

Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
The four aspects of civilian crisis management are: a) police, b) rule of law, c) civilian administration, and d) civil protection.

Priority has been given to the police aspect. A capabilities goal was set, whereby member states should be able to provide 5,000 officers by 2003 for international missions, 1,000 of whom could be deployed within less than 30 days. Based on member states' stated intentions at the first Police Conference (May 10, 2001) and the ensuing Police Capabilities Commitment Conference (Brussels November 19, 2001), 5,000 policemen have been collectively pledged through voluntary national contributions. Greece contributed 180 policemen, of whom 20 are assigned to the rapid deployment police force, which can be deployed within 30 days. Also a Police Action Plan was adopted, while preparation work on all operational aspects of the police mission in Bosnia (EUPM) is advancing at high speed and has neared completion.

With respect to the other aspects of civilian crisis management, the following concrete targets, to be achieved by 2003, have been agreed upon (with the exception of civilian administration):

• on rule of law, the creation of a pool of 200 officials for crisis management operations, especially to supplement police in the criminal justice process. In May 2002, during a Capabilities Commitment Conference, 282 officials were pledged (judges, prosecutors, and further categories of officials and experts in the field of rule of law). Greece contributed 20 officials.
• on civil protection, the creation of a pool of 2,000 persons (the use of the already established Community mechanism is under consideration).
• the setting of a concrete capabilities target in the field of civil administration is still pending.

Greece advocates the comprehensive approach according to which ESDP's two main aspects, the military and the civilian, should develop in a parallel and balanced way. Comprehensive crisis management, through the use of a vast array of political, economic, diplomatic, military and civilian means, consolidates the EU's autonomy as well as its distinct role and “added value” in the security field.

The Greek Presidency on the Military Aspects of ESDP, During the Second Semester of 2002
Due to the Danish opt-out from issues having defence or military implications, Greece will exercise the EU Presidency on the military aspect of ESDP during the second semester of 2002 and for one whole year.

The present juncture is of vital importance for the development of ESDP, not only because of the dramatic developments in the security environment, but also due to the timeframes that have been set by the EU for the attainment of ESDP goals. The year 2003 constitutes the deadline for the achievement of the military and the civilian targets in the field of capabilities, which will lead to the completion of the Union's operational capability.

In this context, the main priority of the Greek Presidency in the military field is the intensification of efforts towards the fulfilment of the Headline Goal and the collective capabilities goals. In November, on the margins of the GAC, the Ministers of Defence will proceed with a comprehensive assessment of the progress achieved and will determine the way ahead.

Of course, in order for Europe to attain full operational capability, relations with NATO will have to be resolved. The Greek Presidency intends to intensify efforts towards reaching an agreement on all outstanding issues so as to conclude a comprehensive settlement as soon as possible. The Greek Presidency will put forward ideas for the improvement of the negotiating process, which will, hopefully, facilitate the attainment of the ultimate goal.

Something that is directly linked to the development of EU-NATO relations is the so-called “participation issue” - in other words, the way in which the “6” non-EU European NATO allies will be involved in the military aspects of crisis management within the ESDP framework. The settlement of this issue has proved to be particularly thorny, but thanks to the efforts of the Spanish Presidency, the SG/HR and member states, progress has been achieved as stated in the Seville European Council's conclusions. The Greek Presidency shall act in accordance with the mandate received in Seville and in collaboration with the SG/HR, will take full advantage of the progress achieved, in order to reach a settlement of this issue that is satisfactory to all.

Furthermore, the Greek Presidency intends to follow up and develop a number of aspects related to the progress of ESDP, which will include, inter alia, the strengthening of cooperation with third states, including potential partners, as well as the furtherance of the Mediterranean dimension, the development of a communication policy geared towards providing the European public with accurate information on ESDP matters, cooperation in the field of armaments, the utilisation of the military capabilities of ESDP in the fight against terrorism, the development of a space policy and a common training system in military crisis management.

Last but not least, the Greek Presidency will attach great importance to enhancing the role of the European Union in the Balkans. As the EU prepares to take over its first military operation, in FYROM, the Greek Presidency will intensify its efforts towards identifying and preparing all operational matters necessary to ensure the operation's smooth transition and successful completion, which will be the first test of the Union's operational capability.

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